ULI453U-RUSSIA, CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASIA
Chapter 3: Russian Foreign Policy
Introduction
Russian foreign policy (RFP) has long been one of the most popular study fields for many scholars, yet there is a little consensus. During the first years of its foundation, Russia has encountered not only new national conditions but also changing international order from bipolarity to unipolarity at first and later multipolarity what currently Russia is seeking to enhance. Russia strives to achieve and sustain a great power that can play a decisive role in international issues of this multipolar world order.
Theoretical Approaches
Since its emergence in international relations, constructivism has been widely used in the study of RFP and contributed to its formation. Constructivism seeks to understand the socially built national identity and “the other” that shapes it, and national interests determined by the national identity and status of the state in global affairs. According to the constructivist theory, the other (a cultural, geographical, or political entity) plays an essential role in defining the self. In this sense, Europe or West, with its cultural, political, ideological similarities and differences, has played an essential role in the formation of Russian national identity and RFP. Another point that constructivists are drawing attention is the recognition of self by the other.
Constructivist studies draw attention to the effectiveness of recognition/nonrecognition of Russia as an equally great power by the West. Since Peter the Great, great powerness has been an essential element of Russian national identity and instrumental for the national interests of the Russian self. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union has deeply shaken it. This shock resulted in Russian endeavor to ensure the recognition of Russia as a great power.
Realist theory stayed as one of the most popular approaches to the RFP. Russian foreign policy itself in the post-soviet period has been conceptualized around neorealist understandings such as national interests, military and economic power, sovereignty, and security. The national interest as a basic concept of the neorealist theory is instrumental in most foreign policy conceptual documents to legitimize its action abroad.
Neoclassical realist theory admits the balance of power and international factors as determinants of Russian foreign policy, taking into account the constructivist concepts such as status or prestige.
Russian Foreign Policy Schools
Several schools of foreign policy thoughts have dominated Russia’s political discourse after the collapse of the Soviet Union and departure from Marxism. A. Tsygankov indicates three individual foreign policy schools – Westernist, statist, and civilizationist. Before the 1917 revolution, Russian elites were divided into two groups as nationalist Slavophiles and Westernizers.
Westernizers, also called Atlanticists, are liberals who advocate Russian engagement to the western free-market economy and better relations with the US and the EU. They see western institutions as the primary instruments for the common development of humanity. Westernist foreign policy views did exist within the Soviet system, too. Yeltsin Government, with his pro-western policies, initially obtained meaningful public support thanks to the then attractive western image in Russia. Another period that the state authorities promoted reconcilement with the West was between 2009-2012 under the presidency of Dimitry Medvedev when he entered into a pan-European security treaty and supported the liberalization of the Russian economic and political system.
The statists (derzhavniki), for whom a powerful state can maintain the political and economic order is significant, are the most influential school of RFP. Since the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov, the ministry of foreign affairs signaled the transition of foreign policy thinking to a more state centric course, in which the national interests are determined independently from western ones. The Eurasian region, comprising former Soviet countries, has priority for the RFP. This view does not underestimate or stand against the West. The balance between the West and East in RFP is significant.
During Primakov’s serve as minister of foreign affairs until 1998, the Russian foreign policy course was based on the Eurasianist view. Nevertheless, the available foreign policy resources did not meet the aforementioned goals. Russia could not stop NATO enlargement or form the planned Moscow-Beijing-Delhi alliance during this period.
In many ways Putin and Primakov’s understandings of international politics are alike. However, unlike Primakov’s plan to restrain the US’s leading role, Putin has been pragmatically eager to develop a partnership with the US in specific fields, for example, the fight against terrorism. Putin’s policy has contained realistic characteristics; emphasizing the national security, the primacy of both territorial unity and sovereignty, the formation of a sustainable democratic and fair global order where Russia can sustain its development and establishment of a good neighborhood around Russian territories. 9/11 attacks in the US have brought the Putin government to an anti-terrorism coalition with NATO. However, Russia, having accepted its enlargement but taken a stand against NATO operation in Kosovo or has not supported the operation of Iraq in 2003. This policy of selective integration with NATO is a clear example of Putin’s pragmatic foreign policy course.
The third school of RFP is civilizationist thinking, claiming the uniqueness of Russian culture and its values, defending its superiority over western culture. Some of the civilizationists have a neo-imperialist view that favors the Russian empire; another group underlines the role of the Orthodox Church.
Resources of Russian Foreign Policy
Foreign policy resources can be described as a set of factors that influence the foreign policy course of the states and serve the governments to fulfill their objectives in the international arena. We will follow the classification of material and non-material resources.
Material Resources
The geography where the Russian territory lies is the first to mention among the material resources, making Russia the largest country in the World. The geopolitical environment of Russia is mostly politically unstable, where Russia borders 14 countries, in which 25 million Russian live. Political and ethnic conflicts in its post- Soviet neighbors, from which there are migration waves, have an immediate impact on the social and economic stability inside Russia.
Russia has to cope with NATO expansion in Europe, challenging climate, re-shaping sea routes, and the rich natural resources in the North, unsolved issues like the Kuril Islands in the East. It encounters pre-modern post- soviet countries with the increasing US presence and rising powers like China and India in the South. These challenges, raising security concerns against external threats due to Russian geography and its long borders, compromise a basis for the argument of the necessity of a powerful Russian army to defend its territories.
Demography represents another material resource of foreign policy. For Russia’s case, it is plausible to call a demographical resource deficit, bearing the resource imbalance between spatial redundancy and rapid decrease in the workforce, rendering the demography the soft spot for Russian security. European part, only about 20% of all territories, is inhabited by 55% of the total Russian population. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian population decreased by half, leaving 150 million soviet citizens outside. Furthermore, Russia has become a nation-state with around 80% of the population is ethnic Russian.
The political and economic turmoil in the country entailed the deterioration of population health, which is not solved yet. Russia, having a population of around 145 million, lower than the population when the Russian Federation was founded, is the ninth most populated country in the world. Yet, it is coping with a low growth rate, emigration, and illegal immigration from former Asian soviet countries.
For three decades, the economy’s role has increased as one of the primary foreign policy tools of modern countries. Russia utilizes several economic instruments such as foreign aid and financing of foreign states, economic sanctions, arms trade, and the energy to achieve its national interests. Russian foreign aid, including selling gas with low prices and financing, has been directed to CIS. Russian economic sanctions are efficient mostly for non-European old Soviet countries. Russia applied
punitive sanctions, including energy price increases and supply disruption on Georgia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States, for their western choices over Russia. On the other hand, Russia uses other sectors, too, such as tourism, goods and products trade, employment of targeted- countries’ citizens in its economic sanctions. For example, in the fighter jet crisis, Russia chose to impose economic sanctions on Turkey in tourism and trade, which resulted in significant loss to the Turkish economy, applied sanctions including trade and financial measures on Georgia, which also changed the elections result in Georgia in conformity of the Russian interests. Russia has placed an embargo on European products as counter- sanctions to western sanctions over Russia following the Crimea crisis.
Russia’s economy, sixth-largest of the world in 2019, is predominantly based on the export of hydrocarbons. Russia is the world’s leading natural gas and the second- biggest oil exporter, making her one of the major players in the global energy market.
Military power. Military Doctrine of Russia (Article 12) remarks on the nonmilitary nature and characteristics of modern warfare conflicts Russia’s military power, the second biggest after the US, having nuclear weapons, and high-tech military industry contribute to its great power status. The utility of military power by Russia as a foreign policy tool to control or stop the conflicts for peace- keeping purposes is not novel (in Moldova, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan). It has to be mentioned that Russia’s use of force is driven mainly by not military but political goals. Russia regards the military build-ups in its adjacent regions and NATO enlargement as a threat to its national security.
Non-material Resources
Political systems and institutions of a country characterize its decision-making process, relations with others, and position in the international system. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia leveled to a more diverse, democratic, open political system. Western criticism of the Russian foreign policy for being short-term oriented and unpredictable draws back to these political instabilities in the first years of political turmoil.
Despite the plethora of foreign policy institutions in the country, the foreign policy making process is concentrated in the presidential office, with the coordination of the ministry of foreign affairs and some high-level officials, giving almost no room for Russian Duma in this process. Foreign policy decisions are made or changed faster in such systems, giving individuals great authority. Yet, it weakens checks and balances procedures, degrading the reliability of Russia in international relations.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the main challenger of the United States soft power with its ideological, cultural, and scientific resources. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has been deprived
of its ideological resources, given that Russian society ideologically has been divided. For its part, it is widely acclaimed both by Russian and foreign experts that the utilization of cultural resources of RFP is very limited.
Russian culture is still deep rooted mostly in the former Soviet countries where the Russian language is primarily spoken. Yet, it is frequently being tested by the infiltration of other cultures. Besides, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has gained strength since the first years of RF, and its international role increased. Further, the 2020 amendments to the Russian constitution include the statement of “belief in God.”
Despite the limited economic resources and losses in the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia has invested in science and technology. However, Russian investment in science and technology concentrates on the military, energy, and informational fields, which are vital in the country’s security perception.
Russian Foreign Policy Directions
The United States
The US has consistently had a central position in the Russian foreign policy concerning its great unshaken power since the Cold War. Since Putin’s Munich Speech in 2007, Russia has made it clear that its objective is to consolidate its place as one of the poles of a multipolar world, which is only possible with the division of the US hegemony. Russian-American relations have gone through several phases since the collapse of the USSR.
The first phase of relations has started in a very positive environment, based on cooperation and abandonment of the military and ideological confrontation with the West. However, the US, trying to maintain its hegemony in a unipolar world, did not consider Russia an equal partner.
American concerns about the emergence and rise of an authoritarian Russia with aggressive foreign policies towards eastern European countries raised. Nevertheless, Russia’s economic and political situation has worsened against the backdrop of American involvement in Russian politics. Russia had to consult with the US advisors for the policy implications to receive more financial aid from Western countries and institutions.
The second phase of relations started with a series of disagreements, relieved with new governments in both countries in 2000 and 2001. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US marked a turning point in bilateral relations, introducing a strategical partnership against terrorism. This strategical cooperation against terrorism has contributed to the dialogue between countries, mostly about the American proposal for national defense build- up, consequently leaving the ABM Treaty. The US’s Iraq intervention in 2003 has revealed the deepened conflict of economic interests of Moscow, and the strategic interests of the US.
The western support for the so-called color revolutions raised the Russian skepticism and criticism over the existing world order and the US policies. Vladimir Putin’s speech in Munich Security Conference in 2007 signaled the next phase of Russian-American relations. During his speech, Putin criticized the efforts to make a unipolar world system, NATO expansion, ill-practiced International Law. Nevertheless, the new Obama Administration has chosen a more constructive relationship with Russia. The conflict of Russian- American national interests was revealed one more time with the break of Arab Spring, and later in the Ukrainian Crisis and the Syrian Civil War with the emergence of a more assertive RFP. The victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election, in which Russia was accused of interfering, resulted in the changing attitude of the White House towards Russia. Trump favored better relations with Russia, offered to lift sanctions, resuming Russia’s G-8 participation.
China and The Asia Pacific
China has shared the Russian political stance against NATO enlargement and operations and the US efforts to withdraw from the ABM treaty and a western-oriented unipolar world order since the 1990s, the color revolutions. Second, China, the same as Russia, has been subjected to the western accusation on its political mechanism for being non-democratic, which goes against their understanding of state sovereignty. The Russian- Chinese relations develop in a quite pragmatic-realist concept. Both sides avoid a zero-sum game in the relations, yet consider the conflicting interests. They act cautiously not to get involved in the other’s conflict with the West.
Moscow and Beijing have long been interested in the development of economic ties. Nonetheless, the bilateral trade is satisfactory for neither Russia nor China. Since the 1990s, an important vector of economic relations has been the Russian arms export to China, who later has developed technologies taken from Russia. Thanks to the arms trade, China became an essential strategical partner of Russia. There is currently no serious problem of any Chinese demographic pressure towards the Far East since the visa agreement with China to control illegal Chinese immigration to Russia (1994).
Tourism and education are notable factors; influencing deepening the social and economic ties of the countries.
Europe
Europe, Russia’s traditional other, is an inseparable part of Russian history and foreign policy. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia’s official position towards Europe has remained to support cooperation in economic, political, and security issues. Russia, on the one hand, emphasizes its position as a great independent power and resists to European interference to its domestic politics.
Russia supports a strong EU, independent from the US, to consolidate the multipolar world order. The dialogue and bilateral agreements (PCA in 1994) with the European Union (EU) have enabled the institutionalization of the political and economic relations with Europe. In its medium-term strategy (1999), Russia accepted the EU as its most important partner.
Despite the will from both sides for cooperation, the relations remained asymmetrical with EU. When Russian efforts to be a fully equal member of the West proved to be futile, and mutual distrust and competition increased, Putin undertook a more pragmatic foreign policy towards Europe, focusing on Russian economic and political interests. Both Russia and the EU (as a part of the West) blamed each other for interfering in the domestic politics of Ukraine, using hybrid warfare. The EU joined the western sanctions on the Russian military and oil industry for its actions towards Ukraine and suspended negotiations for the development of bilateral trade. In response, Russia, as a big market for European goods and products, has imposed counter-sanctions on the import of food products of the EU, US, and Western allies. Especially after the Ukrainian Crisis, the politicization of energy relations has put the sustainability of the market at risk, an undesirable result both for the EU and Russia. Therefore, the EU seeks to reduce its dependence on Russia for energy and to diversify its options.
The CIS
The Commonwealth of Independent States (the CIS) is the priority of the RFP, having three directions: Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia. Eastern European countries (Ukraine ceased to participate in the CIS in 2014, Belarus, and Moldova) have a Slavic identity, Russian population, and a shared history with Russia. The Caucasus (Georgia withdrew in 2008, Azerbaijan, Armenia) plays a role of geopolitical buffer-zone separating Russia from the Middle East, a field of gravity for its Muslim population and a center of ethnic and religious conflicts. Central Asia (Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan-Associate state to the CIS, Uzbekistan) is a geopolitically vulnerable and open post-Soviet geography with rich natural resources for a power struggle between Russia and the US, and later Russia-China-the US.
Energy is an important regulator in Russian relations with the energy-rich countries of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. To some extent, Russian efforts have become successful. However, Russia could not prevent the Chinese entrance into the energy sector of Central Asia, with the construction of new gas pipelines from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to China and the investment in the region, which interrupts Russian monopoly on the Central Asian energy.
The governments such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Baltic states, who joined or endeavored to join the West, faced punitive policies of Russia, such as supply cut-offs and
higher prices. On the contrary, Belarus, which is the most integrated country with Russia among post-Soviet states, mostly enjoyed lower prices for the gas. The change in the RFP towards a more assertive course in the 2000s was urged by series of Color Revolutions in post-Soviet spaces (Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, Kyrgyzstan in 2005), coupled with the rising divergence between Russian-Western.
The MENA
The Middle East and North Africa do not fall into the immediate sphere of influence. Nonetheless, they remain an important vector of RFP for economic, geopolitical, and security reasons. The Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) has been an exceptionally active direction of the Middle Eastern policy of Russia, seeking to be seen, both abroad and inside Russia, as a great power again, authoritative in dealing with global problems.
Russia has developed relations with all political actors in the region, including those who are not welcomed in the West, such as Iran and Hamas, and the US allies like Israel and Turkey. In 2015, when the trajectory of civil war in Syria changed against Bashar Assad, Putin launched the military operation to Syria upon Assad’s request. Russian military involvement in the Syrian Civil War was a strategic step, serving its global policy to have a bargaining chip in its relations with the West after the Ukrainian Crisis, to show its opposition to regime change by force, and finally prevent the growth of ISIS. Russian support for the Assad regime has proved its reliability as an ally. By conducting the Astana Process with Iran and Turkey, through UN-initiated peace talks, Russia used its diplomatic tool effectively to offer an alternative to the old Western technique of democracy export by force.
Vladimir Putin’s domestic concerns over its Muslim population, wars in Chechenia urged him to have better relations with Islamic countries of the region. Although the outbreak of the global Coronavirus pandemic in 2020 has shaken the oil market, and consequently, the Saudi- Russian cooperation, OPEC+ could maintain its authority in the oil market, so did Russia.
The Arctic
Global warming, one of the main topics of the 21st century, has placed the Arctic among the priority regions of the international political agenda. The Russian foreign policy in the Arctic is where Russia promotes international dialog and cooperation the most. Russian official discourse towards regional issues often suggests peaceful international cooperation based on international law. Arctic power role is considered to contribute to great Russian powerness and prestige, supported by a patriotic domestic political discourse. Considering that most of the Russian hydrocarbon and other natural resources are located in the Arctic or sub-Arctic region, and RAZ represents 11% of Russian GDP and 22% of its exports, the Arctic region is vital for Russian economic and energy
security. Against the backdrop of economic stagnation, The RIC Russia maintains grand energy projects in the region, Russia seeks to develop cooperation with its strongest engaging not only Russian but also foreign companies. eastern neighbors and to facilitate the peaceful solution of Increasing militarization is a key security issue in the problems within The Russia-India-China (RIC) for the Arctic. promotion of nonwestern actors in shaping the new
International Organizations in Russian Foreign multipolar world. Creating a strategic alliance with China and India to counterbalance the Western alliance and Policy revive Russia as Primakov initially supported a Eurasian The RFP towards international organizations is central in great power. However, his plan of an Asian trilateral the debate over whether Russia is a revisionist power or alliance failed to materialize due to both the Chinese- status quo power. Indian competition and the hesitance to seem to have an
The UN anti-western foreign policy course.
Since the 1990s, Moscow has utilized its membership in the UNSC in line with Russian national interests, acted more like a status quo power. On the other hand, Russia cooperated with its Western counterparts and China in the UNSC over important issues like the MEPP and sanctions on Iran.
The Group of 20
The increasing role of the Group of 20 (G-20) in the global governance issues, in the context of Russia’s exclusion from the Group of 8 (G-8), serves Russia with an economic and a diplomatic tool to sway global economic issues and ensures its place among leading nations of the multipolar world. Although Russia officially supports cooperation within G-20, the Russian experts are skeptical about its efficiency to solve global economic problems, since the interests of member states are too diverse to reach an agreement over global issues.
The BRICS
Being one of the founder members of the BRICS (then- BRIC, since South Africa joined in 2011), Russia hosted the first BRIC meeting in 2009. BRICS provides Russia a platform to use its soft power to achieve its foreign policy goal. Second, using the collective soft power of the BRICS platform, Russia strengthens its image and prestige in the world community, ebbed after the Ukrainian Crisis. The BRICS countries did not join the Western sanctions, did not criticize Russia over Crimea, and did not support the efforts to isolate Russia politically. The Military Doctrine of Russia (2014) calls stronger cooperation with the BRICS countries to enhance Russian security. Especially international terrorism, an essential dimension of Russian-Chinese relations, have entered to BRICS agenda.
The SCO
The Russian-Chinese treaty (1997) on the decrease of the number of border troops, signed with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, forms the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Today the SCO has risen as a full-fledged anti-hegemonic, nonwestern international organization, countering American influence among its members, as well as international terrorism.