Doctrines, Strategies, and Tactics in Turkish Foreign Policy

The NSPD is normally revised every five years and more often if deemed necessary by the government or the NSC.

The 1923 İzmir Economics Congress accepted liberalism as a guiding principle for new Turkey’s economy.

While nationalism in Kemalist parlance was an anti-imperialistic program for independence, it was also a program for cultural and political westernization. Thus, the  struggle was directed against western imperialism  rather than against the West itself, which allowed  Turkey to connect with the western countries after  the War of Liberation.  

In the early Republican period, Turkey’s western-leaning foreign policy was carried out in conjunction with the establishment of cultural ties with the West. Modernization at this time was identified with westernization. As a result of historical experience of foreign interventions, privileges granted to foreigners, and the capitulations during the Ottoman Empire, the new Turkey was very careful and insistent on complete independence, including “economic, financial, juridical, military, cultural independence and freedom in all matters.

The Treaty of Ankara was signed on October 20, 1921.

Britain was eventually left alone in Anatolia facing the nationalists after the evacuation of Italians from Antalya and the French from Adana Vilayet and Aintab Sanjak (Gaziantep) on October 20, 1921, after signing the Treaty of Ankara. Thus, Turkey was able to concentrate on the  Greek forces in the west, the only remaining ally of Great Britain still on the warpath. 

The annexation of Alexandretta (Hatay) province was achieved only  after Turkey, France, and the UK were able to negotiate a cooperation/alignment agreement against the revisionist  

powers in 1939.

At the 2nd Fascist Congress on March 19, 1934, Mussolini declared that “Italy’s historical objectives are in Asia and Africa” and that “this should be considered a natural expansion”

Turkey’s main objectives during WWII were to avoid involving in the conflict and to evade occupation. Because of the frequent changes of  policies on both sides, Turkey had to deal with  contradictory requests from all sides during the  war with innovative policies and responses. 

What shaped the policies of the Turkish decision-makers throughout the war were threats they perceived from various actors. It was mainly the Italian threat before the war and during most of the first year that informed their choices; subsequently the possibility of German occupation took over until the Battle of Stalingrad. However, from 1941 onwards, the threat perceived from the USSR determined Turkey’s travails during the war and sealed its post-war engagements. These threats were sometimes so intertwined that it became difficult to choose between them - such as the fear between 1941 and 1944 of being either occupied by Germany or liberated by the USSR.

The war started with Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, and later spread to five continents.

Turkey’s fundamental occupation was to avoid getting involved in the conflict.

Its most important arrangements were: 

France and the UK would effectively cooperate and lend maximum aid and assistance to Turkey if  Turkey finds itself in war against a European country as a result of an attack from a European country  (Article 1); 

Turkey would effectively cooperate and lend the maximum aid and assistance to France and the UK if  France and the UK would involve in a war in Mediterranean region led by a European state. (Article 2.1); France and the UK would effectively cooperate and lend maximum aid and assistance to Turkey, if  Turkey would involve in a war in Mediterranean region led by a European state. (Article 2.2); If France and the UK would declare a war against a European country as a result of an attack to eit her one or the other, contractor states would immediately consult each other regarding appropriate res ponse, and Turkey, at the least, would pursue a “friendly” neutrality in all possible situations (Article 4).  Turkey also managed to insert clauses that its responsibilities would begin only after the Allies fulfil led their obligations to supply various military equipment to Turkey to enhance its defense capabilities,  and that Turkey could not be forced to an action that could drag it to a conflict with the USSR.

The end of WWII found Turkey isolated internationally and without many friends, facing the Soviet pressure on its borders. The policy Turkey  had followed during the war, though sufficient to  keep it out of the war, left Turkey without allies.  Thus, while the would-be victors were discussing  the fate of the world at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Turkey was not part of the discussion  except where the USSR tried to get allies to agree  on its position on the Turkish Straits.

While both the Allied and the Axis powers offered various territorial and other advantages to persuade Turkey to join their side, Turkey, though continued negotiating with them, was not moved by these fictitious promises. In these negotiations,  some Turkish leaders appeared as Anglophiles,  while others behaved as Germanophiles as the  conditions demanded. For example, when the  British Ambassador complained in the summer of  1944 to Prime Minister Saraçoğlu that German  warships were passing through the Straits, Saraçoğlu  complained back to him that he was not able to  make himself listened to the Foreign Minister  Menemencioğlu, who was supported by Chief of  Staff Fevzi Çakmak. However, when German ships  were not allowed to pass the Straits and the German  Ambassador complained this time to the Foreign  Minister, the Ambassador was getting the answer  that as a minister he was not able to do anything  because of a direct instruction from the Prime  Minister

The Western bloc established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on April 4, 1949, and the Eastern bloc founded the Warsaw Pact in May 1955. Both blocs also  tried to create economic institutions to promote  their views. The participants at the Bretton  Woods Conference in July 1944 accepted the U.S.  proposal to create a new system to regulate and  manage the world economy that resulted in the  birth of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)  and the World Bank (WB).

While the U.S. moved to prevent the Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe from extending to Western Europe, both Turkey and Greece became part of the tug-of-war between the two blocs. As  a result, President Harry S. Truman declared on  March 12, 1947, that the U.S. would provide  Greece and Turkey with military aid against the  Soviet threat. While the Truman Doctrine was the  military side of the U.S. measures, the Marshall  Plan, geared toward the needs of all West European  nations, was prepared for the economic side.

Following the Korean War, all foreign policy acts of Turkey were affected by its Western-leaning approach such as its active role in establishing the Balkan Pact in 1953 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955 as well as its behavior during the Afro-Asian  Bandung Conference in April 1955, the Suez crisis  of 1956, the Iraqi coup of 1958, the Syrian crisis  of 1957, and regarding the Algerian independence  from France, voting in the UN first unfavorably in  1955 and then abstaining in 1958.

While European institutions and governments encouraged Turkey to return to democracy as soon as possible, Turkish-American relations during the same period expanded, as the U.S. was sympathetic toward the regime under the renewed Cold War atmosphere. Strategic considerations  and closer cooperation between Turkey and the  U.S. were instrumental in bringing about Turkey’s  conciliatory attitude in the Aegean, where Turkish  interests clashed with those of Greece. Turkey’s  political contacts with Islamic and Communist  countries increased, as their largely uncritical  attitude toward the military regime facilitated  closer contacts.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 not only signified the beginning of a new era in international relations but also indicated to new openings for Turkey. The end of the Cold War meant that  Turkey could no longer follow its traditional Cold  War policies. First of all, the fall of the Communist  regimes and the attempts to democratize Russia  and other newly independent states, improved  the possibility of global cooperation that might  transcend the enmities of the Cold War. At the  same time, however, in the absence of clearly  defined mechanisms to prevent regional conflicts,  the instability within the new states as well as the  tensions between them increased the risk of both  interstate clashes and civil wars in the heart of  Eurasia, where Turkey is situated.